This paper contrasts the "static tradeoff" and "pecking order" theories of capital structure choice by corporations. In the static tradeoff theory, optimal capital structure is reached when the tax advantage to borrowing is balanced, at the margin, by costs of financial distress. In the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal to external funds, and debt to equity if external funds are needed. Thus the debt ratio reflects the cumulative requirement for external financing. Pecking order behavior follows from simple asyninetric information models. The paper closes with a review of empirical evidence relevant to the two theories. This paper's title is intended to remind you of Fischer Black's well-known note on "The Dividend Puzzle," which he closed by saying, "What should the corporation do about dividend policy? We don't know." [6, p.8] I will start by asking, "How do firms choose their capital structures?" Again, the answer is, "We don't know."
the pure theory predicts. In general, we have inadequate understanding of corporate financing behavior, and of how that behavior affects security returns.
I do not want to sound too pessimistic or discouraged. We have accumulated many helpful insights into capital structure choice, starting with the most important one, MWs No Magic in Leverage Theorem (Proposition I) [31] . We have thought long and hard about what these insights imply for optimal capital structure. Many of us have translated these theries, or stories, of optimal capital structure into more or less definite advice to managers. But our theories don't seem to explain actual financing behavior, and it seems presumptuous to advise firms on optimal capital structure when we are so far from explaining actinl decisions. I have done more than my share of writing on optimal capital structure, so I take this opportunity to make amends, and to try o push research in some new directions.
I will contrast two ways of thinking about capital structure:
1. A static tradeoff framework, in which the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-value ratio and gradually moving towards it, in much the same way that a firm adjusts dividends to move towards a target payout ratio.
2. An old-fashioned pecking order framework, in which the firm prefers internal to external financing, and debt to equity if it issues securities. In the pure pecking order theory, the firm has no well-defined target debt-to-value ratio.
Recent thretical work has breathed new life into the pecking order framework. I will argue that this theory performs at least as well as the static tradeoff thery in explaining what we know about actnl financing choices and their average Impacts on stock prices.
Managerial and Neutral Mutation Hypotheses I have arbitrarily, and probably unfairly, excluded "managerial" theories which might explain firms' capital structure choices.' I have chosen not to consider models which cut the umbilical cord that ties managers' acts to stockholders' Interests.
I am also sidestepping Miller's idea of "neutral mutation."2 He suggests that firms fall into some financing patterns or habits which have no material effect on firm value. The habits may make managers feel better, and since they do no harm, no one cares to stop or change them. Thus someone who identifies these habits and uses them to predict financing behavior would not be explaining anything important.
The neutral mutations idea is important as a warning. Given time and imagination, economists can usually invent some model that assigns apparent economic rationality to any random event. But taking neutral mutation as a strict null hypothesis makes the game of research too tough to play. If an economist identifies costs of various financing strategies, obtains independent evidence that the costs are really there, and then builds a model based on these costs which explains firms' financing behavior, then some progress has been made, even if it proves difficult to demonstrate that, say, a type A financing strategy gives higher firm value than a type B. (In fact, we would never see type B if all firms follow value-maximizing strategies.)
There is another reason for not immediately embracing neutral mutations:
we know investors are interested in the firm's financing choices, because stock prices change when the choices are announced. The change might be explained as an "information effect" having nothing to do with financing per se--but again, it is a bit too easy to wait until the results of an event study are in, and then to think of an information story to explain them. On the other hand, if one starts by assuming that managers have special information, builds a model of how that information changes financing choices, and predicts which choices will be interpreted by investors as good or bad news, then some progress has been made.
So this paper is designed as a one-on-one competition of the static tradeoff and pecking-order stories. If neither story explains actual behavior, the neutral mutations story will be there faithfully waiting. Costs of adjustment. If there were no costs of adjiustment, and the static tradeoff theory is correct, then each firm's observed debt-to-value ratio should be its optimal ratio. However, there must be costs, and therefore lags, in adjusting to the optimum. Firms can not immediately offset the random events that bump them away from the optimum, so there should be some cross-sectional dispersion of actual debt ratios across a sample of firms having the same target ratio.
Large adjustment costs could possibly explain the observed wide variation in actual debt ratios, since firms would be forced Into long excursions away from their optimal ratios. But there is nothing in the usnl static tradeoff stories suggesting that adjustment costs are a first-order concern--in fact, they are rarely mentioned. Invoking them withoit modelling them is a cop-out.
Any cross-sectional test of financing behavior should specify whether firms' debt ratios differ because they have different optimal ratios or because their actual ratios diverge from optimal ones. It is easy to get the two cases mixed up. For example, think of the early cross-sectional studies which attempted to test MM's Proposition I. These studies tried to find out whether differences in leverage affected the market value of the firm (or the market capitalization rate for its operating income). With hindsight, we can quickly see the problem: if adjustment costs are small, and each firm in the sample is at, or close to its optimum, then the in-sample dispersion of debt ratios must reflect differences in risk or in other variables affecting optimal capital structure. But then MM's Proposition I cannot be tested unless the effects of risk and other variables on firm value can be adjusted for. By now we have learned from experience how hard it is to hold "other things constant" in cross-sectional regressions.
Of course, one way to make sense of these tests is to assume that adjiustment costs are smalL, but managers don't know, or don't care, what the optimal debt ratio is, and thus do not stay close to it. The researcher then assumes some (usually unspecified) "managerial" theory of capital structure choice. This may be a convenient assumption for a cross-sectional test of MM's Proposition I, but not very helpful if the object is to understand financing behavior .
But suppose we don't take this "managerial" fork. Given significant differences in effective marginal tax rates, and given that the static tradeoff theory works, we would expect to find a strong tax effect In any cross-sectional test, regardless of whose thery of debt and taxes you believe. the tax advantage of borrowing to firms facing the full statutory rate, and
(2) the tax advantage of lending (or at least not borrowing) to firms with large tax loss carryforwards, is exactly the same as in the "extreme" theories. Thus, although the theories tell different stories aboit aggregate supply and demand of corporate debt, they make essentially the same predictions abo.it which firms borrow more or less than average.
So the tax side of the static tradeoff theory predicts that IBM should borrow more than Bethlehem Steel, other things equal, and that General Motors' debt-to-value ratio should be more than Chrysler's.
Costs of financial distress. Costs of financial distress include the legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy, as well as the subtler agency, moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs which can erode firm value even if formal default is avoided. We know these costs exist, although we may debate their magnitude. For example, there is no satisfactory explanation of debt covenants unless agency costs and moral hazard problems are recognized.
The literature on costs of financial distress supports two qualitative statements about financing behavior,6
1. Risky firms aight to borrow less, other things equal. Here "risk" would be defined as the variance rate of the market value of the firm's assets. The higher the variance rate, the greater the probability of default on any given package of debt claims. Since costs of financial distress are caused by threatened or actual default, safe firms aight to be able to borrow more before expected costs of financial distress offset the tax advantages of borrowing.
2. Firms holding tangible assets-in-place having active second-hand markets will borrow less than firms holding specialized, intangible assets or valuable growth opportunities. The expected cost of financial distress depends not just on the probability of trouble, but the value lost if troible comes. Specialized, intangible assets or growth opportunities are more likely to lose value in financial distress.
The Pecking Order Theory
Contrast the static tradeff thery with a competing popular story based on a financing pecking order:
1. Firms prefer internal finance.
2. They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities, althcugh dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities.
3. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctations in profitability and investment opportunities, mean that internally-generated cash flow may be more or less than investment otlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down its cash balance or marketable securities portfolio.
4. If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then perhaps equity as a last resort.
In this story, there is no well-defined target debt-equity mix, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom. Each firm's observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance. Though few companies would go so far as to rule out a sale of common under any circumstances, the large majority had not had such a sale in the past 20 years and did not anticipate one in the foreseeable future. This was particularly remarkable in view of the very high Price-Earnings ratios of recent years. Several financial officers showed that they were well aware that this had been a good time to sell common, but the reluctance still persisted. Majiuf and I discuss several possible objectives managers might pursue in this situation. The one we think makes the most sense is maximizing the "true," or "intrinsic" value of the firm's existing shares. That is, the manager worries about the value of the "old" shareholders' stake in the firm.
Morever, investors know the manager will do this. In particular, the "new"
investors who purchase any stock issue will assume that the manager is not on their side, and will rationally adjust the price they are willing to pay.
Define N as the amount by which the shares are over-or undervalued:
-13-N1 -N . Then the manager will issue and invest when y>N .
(1)
If the manager's inside information is unfavorable, N is negative and the firm will always issue, even the only good use for the funds raised is to put them in the bank--a zero-NPV investment.
If the inside information is favorable, however, the firm may pass up a positive-NPV Investment opportunity rather than Issue undervalued shares.
But if management acts this way, its decision to issue will signal bad news to both old and new shareholders. Let V be the market value of firm (price per share times number of shares) it does not Issue, and V' be market value if it does issue; V' includes the value of the newly-issued shares.
Thus, if everyone knows that managers will act according to Ineqnlity (1), the conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium are:12
The total dollar amount raised is fixed by assumption, but the number of new shares needed to raise that amciint is not. Thus N is endogenous: it depends on V' . For example, If the firm issues, the fraction of all shares held by 'new stockholders is N/V' . The manager sees the true value of their claim as:
Thus, given N, x and y, and given that stock Is issued, the greater the price per share, the less value is given up to new stockholders, and the less iN is.
Majluf and I have discussed the assumptions and implications of this model in considerable detail. But here are the two key points:
1. The cost of relying on external financing. We usually think of the cost of external finance as administrative and underwriting costs, and in some cases underpricing of the new securities. Asymmetric Information creates the possibility of a different sort of cost: the possibility that the firm will choose not to Issue, and will therefore pass up a posItive-NPV investment.
This cost Is avoided if the firm can retain enough iriternafly-generated cash to cover its positIve-NPV opportunities.
2. The advantages of debt over equity issues. If the firm does seek external funds, It is better off Issuing debt than equity securities. The general rule is, "Issue safe securities before risky ones."
This second point is worth explaining further. Remember that the firm issues and invests if y, the NPV of Its investment opportunity, is greater than or equal to AN, the amount by which the new shares are undervalued (If AN > 0) or overvalued (if AN < 0). For example, suppose the investment requires N = lO million, but in order to raise that amount the firm must issue shares that are realty worth l2 million. It will go ahead only if project NPV is at least 2 million. If it is worth only l.5 million, the firm refuses to raise the money for it; the intrinsic overall value of the firm is reduced by l.5 million, but the old shareholders are 0.5 million better off.
The manager could have avoided this problem by building up the firm's cash reserves--but that is hindsight. The only thing he can do now is to redesign the security issue to reduce AN. For example, if AN could be cut to $0.5 million, the investment project could be financed without diluting the true value of existing shares. The way to reduce AN is to issue the safest possible securities--strictly speaking, securities whose future val.ue changes least when the manager's inside information is revealed to the market.
Of course, AN is endogencus, so it is loose talk to speak of the manager controlling it. However, there are reasonable cases in which the absolute value of AN is always less for debt than for equity. For example, if the firm can issue default-risk free debt, AN is zero, and the firm never passes up a valuable investment opportunity. Thus, the ability to issue default-risk free debt is as good as cash in the bank. Even if default risk is introduced, the absolute value of AN will be less for debt than for equity if we the customary assumptions of option pricing models.13
Thus, if the manager has favorable information (AN > 0), it is better to issue debt than equity.
This example assumes that new shares or risky debt woild be underpriced.
What if the managers' inside information is unfavorable, so that any risky security issue would be overpriced? In this case, wculdn't the firm want to make AN as large as possible, to take maximum advantage of new investors?
If so, stock would seem better than debt (and warrants better still). The decision rule seems to be, "Issue debt when investors undervalue the firm, and equity, or some other risky security, when they overvaLue it.
The trouble with this strategy is obvious once you put yourself in investors' shoes. If yai know the firm will issue equity only when it is overpriced, and debt otherwise, you will refuse to buy equity unless the firm has already exhausted its "debt capacity"--that is, unless the firm has issued so much debt already that it would face substantial additional costs in issuing more. Thus investors would effectively force the firm to follow a pecking order. This fact is what suggested the pecking order hypothesis in the first place. However, it might also be explained in a static tradeoff theory by adding significant transaction costs of equity issues and noting the favorable tax treatment of capital gains relative to dividends. This would make external, equity relatively expensive. It would explain why companies keep target dividend payouts low enough to avoid having to make regular stock issues.4 It woild also explain why a firm whose debt ratio soars above target does not immediately issue stock, buy back debt, and re-establish a more moderate debt-to-value ratio. Thus firms might take extended excursions above their debt targets. (Note, however, that the static tradeoff hypothesis as usually presented rarely mentions this kind of adjustment cost.)
But the out-of-pocket costs of repurchasing shares seem fairly small. It is thus hard to explain extended excursions below a firm's debt target by an augmented static tradeoff theory--the firm could quickly issue debt and buy back shares. Moreover, if personal income taxes are important in explaining firms' apparent preferences for internal equity, then it's difficult to explain why external equity is not strongly negative--that is, why most firms haven't gradually moved to materially lower target payout ratios and used the released cash to repurchase shares.
Timing of security issues. Firms apparently ry to "time" stock issues when security prices are "high." Given that they seek external finance, they are more likely o issue stock (rather than debt) after stock prices have risen than after they have fallen. For example, past stock price movements were one of the best-performing variables in Marsh's study [21] Exchange offers. Masulis [22, 23] has shown that stock prices rise, on average, when a firm offers to exchange debt for equity, and fall when they offer to exchange equity for debt. This fact coild be explained In varlois ways. For example, it might be a tax effect. If most firms' debt ratios are below their optimal ratios (i.e., to the left of the Dptimum in Figure 1 ), and if corporate interest tax shields have significant positive value, then debt-for-equity exchanges would tend to move firms closer to optimum capital structure. Equity-for-debt swaps would tend to move them farther away.
The evidence on exchanges hardly builds confidence in the static tradeoff theory as a description of financing behavior. If the theory were right, firms woild be sometimes above, and sometimes below, their optimum ratios.
Those above would offer to exchange equity for debt. Those below would offer debt for equity. In both cases, the firm would move closer to the optimum.
Why should an exchange offer be good news if in one direction and bad news if in the ) ther?
As Nasulis points oit, the firm's willingness to exchange debt for equity might signal that the firm's debt capacity had, in management's opinion, increased. That is, it woild signal an Increase in firm value or a reduction in firm risk. Thus, a debt-for-equi:y exchange would be good news, and the opposite exchange bad news.
This "information effect" explanation for exchange offers is surely right in one sense. Any time an announcement affects stock price, we can infer that the announcement conveyed information. That is not much help except to prove that managers have some information investors do not have.
The idea that an exchange offer reveals a change in the firm's target debt ratio, and thereby signals changes in firm vaLue or risk, soinds plausible.
But an equally plausible storf can be told without saying anything about a target debt ratio. If the manager with superior information acts to maximize the intrinsic value of existing shares, then the announcement of a stock issue shoild be bad news, other things equaL , because stock issues will be more likely when the manager receives bad news)7 On the other hand, stock retirements should be good news. The news in both cases has no evident necessary connection with shifts in target debt ratios.
It may be possible to build a model combining asymmetric information with the costs and benefits of borrowing emphasized in static tradeoff stories. My guess, however, is that it will prove difficult to do this withait aLso introducing some elements of the pecking order story.
Issue or repurchase of shares. The fifth fact is no surprise given the fourth. On average, stock price falls when firms announce a stock issue. This fact is again hard to explain by a static tradeoff model, except as an information effect in which stock issues or retirements signal changes in the firm's target debt ratio. I've aLready commented on that.
The simple asymmetric information model I used to motivate the pecking order hypothesis does predict that the announcement of a stock issue will cause stock price to fall. It also predicts that stock price shoi id not faLl., other things equal, if default-risk debt is issued. Of course, no private company can issue debt that is absolutely protected from default, but it seems reasonable to predict that the average stock price impact of high-grade debt issues will be small relative to the average impact of stock issues. This is what Dann and Mikkleson [10] find.
These results may make one a bit more comfortable with asymmetric information models of the kind sketched above, and thus a bit more comfortable with the pecking order story.
That's the five facts. Here now are three items that do not qualify for that list--just call then "observations."
Existence of target ratios. Marsh [21] and Taggart [39] have faind some evidence that firms adjust towards a target debt-to-value ratio. However, a model based solely on this partial adjustment process would have a very low R2. Apparently :he static tradeoff model captures only a small part of actual behavior.18
Risk. Risky firms tend to borrow less, other things equil. For example,
both Long and Malitz [20] and Williamson [41] found significant negative relationships between unlevered betas and the level of borrowing. However, the evidence on risk and debt policy is not extensive enough to be totally convincing.
Taxes. I know of no study clearly demonstrating that a firm's tax status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy.'9 I think the wait for such a study will be protracted.
Admittedly it's hard to classify firms by ax status without implicitly classifying them on other dimensions as well. For example, firms with large tax loss carryforwards may also be firms in financial distress, which have high debt ratios almost by definition. Firms with high operating profitabiliy, and therefore plenty of unshielded income, may also have valu3ble intangible assets and growth opportunities. Do they end up with a higher or lower than average debt-to--value ratio? Hard to say.
Conclusion
Paple feel comfortable with the static tradeoff story because it soinds plausible and yields an interior optimum debt ratio. It rationalizes "moderate" borrowing.
Well, the story may be moderate and plausible, but that does not make it right. We have to ask whether it explains firms' financing behavior. If it does, fine. If it does not, then we need a better theory before offering advice to managers.
The static tradeoff story works to some extent, but it seems to have an unacceptably low R2. Actual debt ratios vary widely across apparently similar firms. Either firms take extended excursions from their targets, or the targets themselves depend on factors not yet recognized or understood.
At this point we face a tactical choice between two research strategies.
First, we coild try :o expand the static tradeff story by introducing adjustment costs, possibly including those stemming from asymmetric information and agenc' problems. Second, we caild start with a story based on asymmetric information, and expand it by adding only those elements of the static tradeDff which have clear empirica' support. I think we will progress farther faster by the latter route.
Here is what I really think is going on. I warn you that the following "modified pecking order" story is grossly oversimplified and underqinlified.
But I think it is general].j consistent with the empirical evidence.
1. Firms have good reasons to avoid having to finance real investment by issuing common stock or other risky securities. They do not want to run the risk of falling into the dilemma of either passing by positive-NPV projects or issuing stock at a price they think is too low.
2. They set target dividend payout ratios so that norma'. rates of equicy investment can be met by internally generated funds.
3. The firm may also plan to cover part of normal investment oatlays with new borrowing, but it tries to restrain itself enough to keep the debt safe--that is, reasonably close to default-risk free. It restrains itself for two reasons: first, to avoid any material costs of financial distress; and second, to maintain financial slack in the form of reserve borrowing power. "Reserve borrowing power" means that it can issue safe debt if it needs to.
4. Since target dividend payout ratios are sticky, and investment opportunities fluctuate relative to internal cash flow, the firm will from time to time exhaust its ability : o issue safe debt. When this happens, the firm turns to less risky securities first--for example, risky debt or convertibles before common stock.
The crucial difference between this and the static tradeoff story is that, in the modified pecking order story, observed debt ratios will reflect the cumulative requirement for external financing--a requirement cumulated over an extended period.20 For example, think of an unusual'y profitable firm in an industry generating relatively slow growth. That firm will end up with an unusually low debt ratio compared to its industry's average, and it won't do much of any: hing about it. It won't go out of its way to issue debt and retire equity to achieve a more normal debt ratio.
An unprofitable firm In the same industry will end up with a relatively high debt ratio. If it is high enough to create significant costs of financial distress, the firm may rebalance its capital structure by issuing equiy. On the other hand, it may not. The same asymmetric information problems which sometimes prevent a firm from issuing stock to finance real investment will sometimes also block issuing stock to retire debt.21
If this story is right, average debt ratios will vary from industry to industry, because asset risk, asse :ype, and requirements for external funds also vary by industry. But a long-run industry average will not be a meaningful target for individual firms in that industry.
Let me wrap this up by noting the two clear gaps in my description of "what is really going on." First, the modified pecking order story depends on sticky dividends, but does not explain why he are sticky. Second, it leaves us with at best a fuzzy understanding of when and why firms issue common equity. Unfortunately I have nothing to say on the first weakness, and only the following brief comments on the second.
The modified pecking order story recognizes both asymmetric information and costs of financial distress. Thus the firm faces two increasing costs as it climbs up the pecking order: it faces higher odds of incurring costs of financial distress, and also higher odds that future posltive-NPV projects will be passed by because the firm will be unwilling to finance them by issuing common stock or other risky securities. The firm ma, choose to reduce -25these costs by issuing stock now even if new equi:y is not needed immediately to finance real investment, just to move the firm down the pecking order. In other words, financial slack (liquid assets or reserve borrowing power) is valuable, and the firm may rationalLy issue stock to acquire it. (I say "may' because the firm which issues equt.y to buy financial slack faces the same asymmetric information problems as a firm issuing equity to finance real investment.) The optimal dynamic issue strategy for the firm under asymmetric 22 information is, as far as I know, totally unexplored territory.
FOOTNOTES *Sloan School of Management, MIT, and National Bureau of Economic Research.
1.
The finance and economics literature has at least three "managerial" strands: (1) If it is more, the firm first pays off debt or invests in cash or marketable securities. If the surplus persists, it may gradually increase its target payout ratio.
8.
Although I have not seen the term "pecking order" used before.
9.
These figures were computed from Brealey and Myers [7] , Table 14 -3, p. 291.
10.
For example, see Berle [4 ] , or Berle and Means [5] .
11.
If the firm always has a zero-NPV opportunity available to it, the r'J f'.J distrbution of y is truncated at y = 0. I also assume that x is non-negative.
12.
The simple model embodied in (1) and (2) is a direct descendant of Akerlof's work [1] . He investigated how markets can fail when buyers can not verify the quility of what they are offered. Faced with the risk of buying a lemon, the buyer will demand a discount, which in turn discoi rages the potential sellers who do not have lemons. However, in
Majiuf's and my model, the seller is offering not a single good, but a partial claim on two, the investment project (worth y) and the firm without the project (worth x). The information asymmetry applies to both goods--for example, the manager may receive inside information that amounts to good news about x and bad news about y, or vice versa, or good or bad news aboit both.
Moreover, the firm may suffer by not selling stock, because the investment opportunity is lost. Management will sometimes issue even when the stock is undervalued by investors. Consequently, investors on the other side of the transaction do not automatically interpret every stock issue as an attempted ripoff--if they, did stock woild never be issued in a rational expectations equilibrium.
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13.
This amounts to assuming that changes in firm value are lognormally distributed, that managers and investors agree on the variance rate, and Regulated firms, particularly electric utilities, typically pay dividends generous enough to force regular trips to the equity market.
They have a special reason for this polic,r : it improves their bargaining position vs. consumers and regulators. It turns the opportunity cost of capital into cash requirements.
15.
Jalilvand and Harris [16], for example.
16.
The problem is not that intangibles and growth opportunities are risky.
The securities of growth firms may be excellent collateral. But the firm which borrows against intangibles or growth opportunities may end up reducing their value.
17.
This follows from the simple model presented above. See Myers and Majluf [34] for a formal proof.
18.
Of course, we could give each firm its own target, and leave that target free to wander over time. But then we would explain everything and know nothing. We want a thery which predicts how debt ratios vary across firms and time.
19. For example, both Williamson [41] and Long and Malitz [20] introduced proxies for firms' tax status, but failed to find any significant, independent effect on debt ratios.
-30-20.
The length of that period reflects the time required to make a significant shift in a target dividend payait ratio.
21.
The factors that make financial distress costly also make it difficult to escape. The gain in firm value from rebalancing Is highest when the firm has gotten into deep trouble and lenders have absorbed a significant capital toss. In that case, rebalancing gives lenders a windfall gain. This is why firms In financial distress often do not rebatance their capital structures.
22.
If the information assymetry disappears from time to time, then the firm clearly should stock up with equity before it reappears. This observation is probably not much practical help, however, because we lack an objective proxy for changes In the degree of asymmetry.
